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in a Changing World

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INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD

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The theme of the 2007 National Foreign Policy Conference was <u>Conflict, Reconstruction and the Dilemma of Intervention</u>. In his opening keynote remarks Professor Hampson reviewed the changing patterns of conflict between and within states, analysing the familiar sources of conflict- state failure, group rivalries, bitter competition for resources and wealth - as well as the rise of terrorism. Against this background Professor Hampson discussed the crucial and often successful role of international intervention, by global and regional organizations, by individual states large and small, and by non-governmental institutions, in helping states riven by conflict to bring it under control and to rebuild their societies. He concluded with five recommendations for Canadian policy and action.

La Conférence de politique étrangère 2007 tenue à Montréal les 22 et 23 mars avait pour thème le conflit, la reconstruction et le dilemme de l'intervention. Dans son discours d'ouverture, le professeur Hampson a examiné le tableau changeant des conflits inter et intra États, analysant les sources habituelles de conflit (État non viable, rivalités entre groupes, concurrence féroce pour les ressources et les richesses), et la montée du terrorisme. C'est sur cette toile de fond qu'il a discuté du rôle fondamental et souvent fructueux de l'intervention internationale par les organisations mondiales et régionales, les États grands et petits et les institutions non gouvernementales en vue d'aider les États déchirés par les conflits à rétablir l'ordre et à reconstruire leur société. Il a conclu en donnant cinq recommandations au Canada en matière de politique et de mesures à prendre.

Fen Osler Hampson is Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. This article is based on his opening address to the 2007 National Foreign Policy Conference of the Canadian International Council on March 22, 2007.

At the turn of the last century, the British historian G.P. Gooch wrote "We can now look forward with something like confidence to the time when war between civilized nations will be considered as antiquated as the duel, and when peacemakers shall be called the children of god." The British economist and Nobel laureate, Sir Norman Angell, offered an equally sunny forecast in his book *The Great Illusion* (1910). He argued that the forces of globalization would inevitably create a more peaceful world: "Commercial development," he wrote, "is broadly illustrating one profound truth: that the real basis of social morality is self-interest. If the subject of rivalry between nations is business, the code which has come to dominate business must necessarily come to dominate the conduct of governments."

Such optimism was sadly misplaced. The twentieth century came to be known as the century of 'total war' not only because it witnessed two major conflagrations that engulfed much of the planet, but also because it saw the dawn of the nuclear age.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, many hoped the page had turned to a more peaceful chapter in world history. Recall President George Herbert Walker Bush's triumphant vision of 'a new world order.' However, the outbreak or continuation of sectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and other corners of the globe; the emergence of a more lethal and global brand of terrorism; and a growing cultural divide between Islam and the West dashed many of those hopes. At the same time, there were troubling signs that international norms and institutions, which helped check the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other technologies of mass destruction during the past century, were eroding as a number of states-North Korea, Pakistan, and India-crossed the nuclear threshold. Judging from its first years, the twenty-first century seems, at first glance, no less dangerous or conflict prone than its predecessor.

Over the past forty years, however, we have learned much about the sources and nature of conflict as well as the means to

prevent or contain war. And over the past decade, scholars, diplomats, nonofficial practitioners, and others have turned their attention to studying and understanding the causes of sectarian violence and global conflict trends.

GLOBAL CONFLICT TRENDS

A somewhat surprising picture emerges from this new research. There is now compelling statistical evidence that the high water-mark of global conflicts came just as the Cold War was ending. Since then, there has been a steady decline, not just in the number of intrastate wars, but also in their lethality as measured by the number of victims of these conflicts. These statistics also reveal surprising news about interstate conflict - specifically that the number of interstate wars has remained at relatively low, if consistent, levels since World War II.

That some countries and regions are much more conflict prone than others is also striking. The locus of regional violence, measured by the number of battle-related war deaths, has shifted over the past five decades. From 1946 to the mid-1970s, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania accounted more than half the world's battle deaths, but that region is now one of the world's most peaceful with the ending of conflicts in Vietnam and Cambodia. Sub-Saharan Africa went from being a relatively peaceful area during the final fifteen years of colonial rule that succeeded World War II to being the most violent in the 1980s and 1990s. The Middle East and North Africa have also been important zones of conflict, peaking with the Iran-Iraq War in the late 1970s, which saw the highest sustained level of casualties and deaths in the region. With the exception of the bloody civil wars that erupted in Central America in the late 1970s (and the ongoing civil war in Colombia), the Americas as a whole have generally been quite peaceful for the past half century. So, too, has Western Europe, although it saw conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque region. Eastern Europe and Central Asia have seen a mix of savage conflict and peaceful transitions over the same period.

The trend, however, is not all toward a reduction in violence and death. Although civilian deaths related to conflict have gone down overall, the recent bloody mayhem in Darfur and massive killings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo show that horrific conflict is still with us. And since 1982, the number of "significant" terrorist attacks, those that have involved "loss of life, serious injury or major property damage", has risen steadily.

Although terrorists continue to lack the technological capacity to build nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction there is little ground for complacency. The proliferation of such technologies increases the risk that they will fall into the wrong hands. Financier Warren Buffett has a sobering calculation of the odds: "assuming a 10 percent chance of a nuclear attack in any given year, the odds of surviving 50 years without an attack are less than 1 percent. If the odds of an attack can be reduced to 1 percent per year, the chances of making it 50 years without a nuclear detonation improve to better than even."

Terrorists are showing greater ingenuity in developing lethal conventional weaponry. Since the end of January, Iraq witnessed three unsuccessful attempts to use chemical bombs, which use chlorine that is dispersed by conventional explosives. In every instance, the explosion burned the chlorine rather than dispersing it. Last week they finally got lucky, killing 20 and gassing another 200 victims.

EXPLAINING CONFLICT TRENDS
Explaining the changing trends in the pattern of international conflict is difficult.

At the level of the international system, the absence of interstate conflict - especially great power conflict both during and after the Cold War - is explained by (a) the sobering effect of nuclear weapons and deterrence, which encourage states to behave prudently; and (b) the fact that the great powers of the international system today, perhaps for the first time in history, are essentially 'status quo' powers - that is to say, they have a vested interest in global stability and the status quo. This is also

true of rising powers in the international system, like China. China is both an inwardly-preoccupied, status quo accommodater with regional standing and a global poseur with neomercantilist ambitions that are nonetheless directed at promoting its own economic growth. India, except for bossy interventions at or near its border is almost entirely focused on its radical economic transformations and always-noisy democracy.

The spread of democracy and growing economic interdependence have also enhanced the prospects for peace, contributing to what some scholars have called 'the Kantian peace,' especially in formerly war-prone regions of the globe like Europe.

Many regard the end of the Cold War - which also saw an end to many of the superpower-instigated 'proxy wars' in the Third World - as explaining the decline in civil and regional conflicts around the globe in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. But it is important not to stack the historical deck. The bipolar system also checked and prevented many conflicts from breaking out, and the Soviet collapse followed by U.S. disengagement coincided with a number of 1990s conflicts that might never have occurred in Cold War times, including wars in Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia (and its neighbors), Afghanistan (between the Mujahideen and Taliban), Aceh/Moluccas/East Timor, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, and the Balkans.

Another reason why so many armed conflicts were long civil wars that persisted for decades is that the belligerents were deadlocked in a military stalemate in which none of the protagonists could win. This was certainly the case in El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and even Cambodia. Confronted with a 'hurting stalemate,' many warring parties in different conflict zones looked for a negotiated way out of their impasse. The fact that so many of these conflicts were indeed ripe for resolution made the job of mediation and conflict management both doable and easier.

A third possible explanation for the changing trends in conflict involves outside intervention. The lessons of the peaceful

interventions of the past decade point to the conclusion that the international community - both official and nonofficial actors - has played an important role in conflict management and in so doing has had a remarkably good track record, even in conflict zones such as the Balkans and the Horn of Africa, which many initially trumpeted as intervention failures.

OLD AND NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

Today we are confronted by old and new security challenges. In addition to changes in the global security environment arising from the increasing threat of terrorism, widening fractures between and among cultures, and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, there have been changes in the perception of that environment among the leading states of NATO and the European Union and many other societies. This perception includes new attitudes about the hierarchy of interests linked to conflict arenas where these challenges often arise. It also includes a heightened overall sense of insecurity and division in the international system.

There is enough evidence to suggest that all things did not change in 2001 and that many of the familiar sources of conflict - for example, security dilemmas, state failure, economic predation, political transitions - remain as valid and relevant in today's world as before.

As an example, consider the increasingly salient fragmentation within the Islamic world and between it and other cultures and regions. While the members of al Qaeda may be unified by a hatred of the United States and the West, the societies that they spring from are struggling with much more basic issues: the tensions of modernization, including unequal wealth distribution and unmet expectations; suppressed democracy; internal divisions; and unstable neighborhoods. The anti-Western mobilization is but a new trigger in an already explosive environment, and an example of the combination of old and new security challenges.

As the World Bank also reminds us in its recent report, *Global Economic Prospects 2007*, globalization, which is contributing to

the rapid growth in average incomes in the next 25 years, "*with developing countries playing a central role*," will be accompanied "*by growing income inequality and potentially severe environmental pressures.*" The greatest danger is that some regions, notably sub-Saharan Africa, will be left behind. There is also a growing risk of rising income inequalities within countries.

There are other developments that also pose a threat to political stability. The so-called 'third wave' of democracy has witnessed the emergence of democratically elected, populist authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the Middle East-regimes that are distinctly 'illiberal' in the practice of governance and that, in some cases, pose a direct threat to their neighbors. Accompanying this development is the rapid growth of paramilitary organizations worldwide. These paramilitary constabularies are typically better armed and equipped than the police and military forces of a country, and they also operate outside normal legal and political constraints. Such organizations are to be found throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America and are increasingly assuming responsibility for a wide range of so-called internal security functions, with the blessing of national or local state authorities. Nor are paramilitary organizations the exclusive prerogative of right-wing governments. The efforts of Venezuela's leader, Hugo Chavez, to begin training a vast army of civilian reserves, allegedly to fight off a U.S. invasion, are consistent with this growing international trend to privatize and decentralize security.

Many countries are also teetering on the precipice of instability. Although many of these countries have embraced democracy, it is literally only skin deep. State institutions lack political legitimacy. Public goods that we take for granted, such as clean water, roads, basic health services, and a security environment where citizens feel safe, are either non-existent or in short supply. The fact that so many countries are susceptible to internal conflict and social disintegration suggests that there is still enormous potential for instability in the international system. The "failed state index," developed by The Fund For Peace and *Foreign Policy*

magazine, finds that some 60 countries in the world are dysfunctional because the government does not effectively control its territory, provide basic services to its citizens, or the country is experiencing some kind of internal unrest.

Monty Marshall and his colleagues at the University of Maryland have called these unstable democratic regimes *anochracies*, which "reflect an inherent quality of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict or adverse regime changes."

Regional stability also continues to be compromised by those longstanding conflicts that fester and that remain largely intractable - for example, Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka, Jammu and Kashmir, Sudan, China-Taiwan, North Korea. Many of these conflicts and areas of tension have refused to succumb to repeated rounds of mediation or third-party efforts to broker some kind of lasting political settlement. Some are breeding grounds for terrorism and a major source of international instability because of the obvious risks that an escalation of these conflicts poses to their neighborhoods.

According to Marshall, "the most troubling regional sub-systems in the Globalization Era are the regions constituted by the sub-Saharan African countries and the pre-dominantly Muslim countries, which stretch from Morocco and Senegal in the west to Malaysia and Indonesia in the east. The Lorenz curves for these two regions are roughly equivalent; income inequality among African countries is only slightly greater than income inequality among Muslim countries." It is also apparent that "although the general magnitude of armed conflict in both regions has diminished substantially in since the end of the Cold War, the overall decrease in warfare in Africa has fallen more slowly than the general global trend." Muslim countries, however, "are the sole region (sic) where there has been an increase in armed conflict in recent years, possibly leveling, or even reversing, the general downward [global] trend."

THE PLACE OF INSTITUTIONS
IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan are sobering reminders of the performance of outside actors in dealing with the power dynamics among local parties in civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorist violence. Military and economic power tools may be essential, but they can be blunt instruments, hard to control and harder to translate into desired political outcomes. It is increasingly difficult to muster and sustain the political will to deploy coercive instruments to prevent or terminate security threats. And the right kinds of coercive power to support conflict management remain in short supply, with their distribution among suppliers lopsided in the extreme.

During the 1990s, great powers and international organizations such as the United Nations began to play a much greater role in conflict management processes, including the mediation and negotiation of international disputes. The same is true of regional and sub-regional organizations, which also began to expand their roles in conflict management, sometimes with the support and backing of the international community.

At the same time, a wide variety of small-state and non-state actors also offered their services in conflict management and resolution processes with positive effect. For example, small and medium-sized powers, such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland, which had long been active in international peacekeeping operations, began to market actively their negotiation and intermediary services to warring parties. From the Middle East to Central America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region, these countries played key roles in instigating negotiations between warring sides, backstopping negotiations once they got under way, and ensuring that the parties remained committed to the peace process after a negotiated settlement was reached.

Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Community of Sant'Egidio - a Catholic lay organization that was a key mediator in Mozambique and Algeria-also played important roles in bring-

ing parties to the negotiating table and creating much-needed forums for dialogue, discussion, and negotiation, especially at the intercommunal and societal levels.

Today, we need to broaden and deepen the base of capability for conflict management, and to diversify and strengthen the array of international institutions available for these purposes. The burdens of coercive and noncoercive conflict management are not ideally distributed; some regions participate more fully than others in managing their own security affairs and mobilizing effective conflict prevention and response mechanisms. The sweeping changes facing many parts of the international system are in themselves a source of instability. Modernization, democratization, globalization, and other contemporary dynamics are forces of change and as such are potentially destabilizing. For all these reasons, the international system needs strengthened capacity that is more evenly distributed across institutions and across continents.

THE PLACE OF STATE BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

There remain unanswered questions as we grapple with the problems of state building and democratic governance.

Since the collapse of European empires, the assumption has been that new states emerging in their wake would have whatever time it took to develop effective and legitimate institutions of governance. Outside powers pursued their local and regional interests, competed for influence, and engaged, especially after the end of the Cold War, in various forms of capacity building and intervention to contain or help resolve violent conflict. Regional actors in formerly dependent areas gradually took control of their own destiny while intensifying linkages to the major world power centers of Europe, Asia, and North America.

Since September 11, 2001, however, new understandings have challenged this assumption. It is no longer accepted that chaotic, ill-governed regions and zones of failed modernization should be allowed to flounder toward an uncertain future.

Implicit in many of the dramatic actions and debates in world politics since that time has been the question of urgency. How much time is there for these places to sort themselves out? What is the proper role of outsiders in bringing it about? If nation building appears thwarted in societies immersed in or emerging from conflict, what should be done to jump-start the process of building effective sovereign states and democratic polities?

Some of the most challenging issues in world politics and foreign policy arise in this context: what is the proper place of sovereignty and how should it be limited in the interests of human societies living within states? What have we learned about the role of external powers in bringing order, stability, and democratic institutions to societies in conflict? What is the relationship between political and economic governance in building effective states and stronger nations?

From the 17th to the 20th century, war was essential to the state-building exercise. It defined state borders and united diverse populations within the nation-state. This circumstance has changed dramatically in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Not only do civil wars strike at the heart of what it means to be a state, but they sometimes, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, result in state disintegration. In other cases, for example Sudan, they yield to a negotiated settlement that puts off to a later date the decision on the nature of the state but does not resolve it. And in many cases, Sudan's neighbor Somalia provides a tragic confirmation, the conflict simply eats away at the state's ability to function as a state. A key question of state-building is how much capacity the state must have in order to make the transition from war to peace. This is an issue to which there is no clear answer.

FRAMING THE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE

Another critical element is understanding the importance of *framing*, that is, the way you, and others, see the problem. These lenses determine how you define the conflict and grasp

the tools in the 'tool kit' of conflict management. For example, the relative emphasis placed on hard power and coercive tools, as compared with political approaches and the use of soft or nonofficial forms of power, depends, at least in part, on how the challenge or threat is viewed. Those whose focus naturally gravitates toward violent civil conflicts that feature high levels of human suffering and the associated ills of state failure will concentrate on the uses of hard power to stop abuses and foster better governance. Their attention centers on the tools, techniques, conditions, and institutions for coercive intervention in conflict-ridden societies. Those who focus on the political and social bases of violent conflict, within or between states, concentrate on the application of political, diplomatic, economic, normative, and legal tools alongside (or in lieu of) physical coercion.

Similarly, observers concerned with the legitimacy of intervention and using force in the service of conflict management tend to concentrate on the role of norms and institutions and debates about the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in managing conflict and related security challenges such as terrorism and weapons proliferation. In contrast, those concerned about the efficacy and capacity of outsiders to manage other peoples' conflicts are more likely to emphasize the importance of statecraft and skilled coordination as well as the 'gaps' in coercive capacity available to the international community, and the inherent limitations of using physical power to influence events. Differences of framing may also emerge from the national interests and circumstances of different societies and their particular histories.

Recognizing the importance of framing also helps in understanding the current security environment. At the present time, Russian leaders may see their country as a victim of terrorism, as a peace builder and conflict manager in the 'near abroad,' and as a country returning to historic patterns of internal stability after the shocks of post-Soviet transformation - in other words, somewhat differently from the way others perceive it. Russian leaders' perceptions of the United States, as underscored by Vladimir Putin's recent speech in Germany, are also changing.

For many Americans, the global security environment appears to pose more threats and dangers than it did during the 1990s or the Cold War, a mind-set that leads to preoccupation with contingencies of direct, physical threat as contrasted with the seemingly indirect security challenges posed by international conflict in other places. European leaders and their counterparts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have their own perspectives on these issues, shaped by their experience and circumstances.

As 9/11 recedes, it is apparent that global frames of reference have been diverging and the degree of consensus on the priorities for conflict management is declining. These divergent perceptions have severely reduced the likelihood of coherent and effective international responses to security challenges.

The United States is now entering a major debate and re-evaluation of its security commitments - a debate that is driven by the electoral cycle. To many, the US is already on the path to disengagement from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Friends, allies, rivals, and potential adversaries will all be influenced by the choices that emerge from the transition. Already, some Europeans are worried that the transatlantic divide has deepened and widened into an unbridgeable chasm as France and Germany pursue their own visions of security. It matters whether, working with its partners and key security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations, the United States is able to isolate and 'fix' the direct security challenges. It matters whether it has the energy and the constructive optimism to sustain its long-standing engagement in the search for a more peaceful and less threatening world. An alternative scenario in which U.S. policies come to be viewed as exacerbating tension and undercutting U.S. influence could trigger a contrasting mood of isolation, retrenchment, and focus on a narrower, defensive agenda that tolerates or ignores foreign conflicts in order to address direct threats. This would undoubtedly make it difficult, if not impossible, to mount collective capacities for intervention in troubled regions of the globe in the future.

Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel has argued that we need to move toward a more comprehensive, networked security system that ties together structures within the NATO alliance that are far too compartmentalized, and to do so not only within capitals but also between countries. But this will also require the bridging of conflicting strategic cultures among NATO's members where American *exceptionalism* continues to pose a barrier to genuine security cooperation.

The United Nations, too, is struggling with a number of fundamental issues concerning its role. Several panels and review boards have undertaken examinations of the United Nations; none has called for an end to the institution, but all have called for changes in the way it functions. Prominent among these recommendations are proposals to strengthen and enlarge the Security Council, institute new normative benchmarks for humanitarian intervention, enhance and streamline the administrative capacities of the organization, provide for greater financial accountability and transparency in its operations, strengthen its role in the promotion and advancement of human rights, and create new mechanisms and capacity so that the organization can play a more effective role in peacebuilding and nation building.

While it is a time of transition for major players in conflict management, it also is a time of transition for conflict itself. As I noted earlier, there is evidence that conflict is diminishing in quantity and lethality. It is, however, an open question as to whether the downward trend in armed conflict will continue or begin to turn upward as the many failed or ailing states in the international system find themselves wracked by a host of social, economic, and political problems that they are ill equipped to manage and that feed the fires of social and political discontent. And then there is the ever-present-and perhaps increasing-threat of terrorism.

Clearly, the so-called war on terrorism will not be won simply by targeting terrorists. The international community must apply the instruments of conflict management and prevention, which worked so well in the past, to the breeding grounds of terrorism-

the conflict zones of so-called failed states and those regions where intractable conflicts endure. If diplomacy, negotiation, and economic development had ended the brutal wars in Sudan and Afghanistan long ago, the world might look quite different today. Al Qaeda operatives would have had fewer places to hide and to plan, organize, and prepare for their attacks in New York, Washington, London, Madrid, and elsewhere. Despite powerful arguments supporting the need for sustained engagement in conflict management and peacebuilding/nation building, there is the sobering risk that 'intervention fatigue' has already set in as a result of recent misadventures that have gone horribly wrong and turned the tide of public opinion in western democracies.

What are some of the implications for Canadian foreign and security policy during this obvious time of transition?

First, we should not be too hasty about abandoning our traditional peacekeeping vocation, especially when it comes to helping and training others who want to get into the peacekeeping business. Although there are more than 100,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the globe, this is not enough. Of the 113 countries contributing troops, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are doing the heavy lifting. Poland is the largest western contributor. Recruiting qualified and highly professional peacekeepers is a serious problem. The UN is a public hospital trauma clinic. We may have to double the number of peacekeepers given what is coming at us. It will be necessary to look beyond the current roster of troop contributing countries. We need to mobilize Chinese potential. Europeans can contribute a lot more. There continues to be a real shortage of capacity to enforce, monitor and ensure that peace agreements work and to enforce the peace on the rocky road to a political settlement.

Second, diplomacy matters. One of the key lessons of the last decade is that the lion's share of civil wars and regional conflicts ended through a process of negotiation which was led by a wide variety of third parties, including great powers, middle powers, international and regional organizations, and even NGOs. Such diplomacy is just as relevant today to ending

the many conflicts that litter the global landscape. As a country with global interests, Canada has an important role to play in the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Third, the African sub-continent should not be allowed to fall off the international - and Canadian - radar screen. Africa is a region at risk for many of the reasons I have mentioned. But it is also a continent that is rich with potential. But if states and societies are allowed to fail, Africa will export its problems to other corners of the globe, including our own. And it will be a safe haven and breeding ground for transnational criminal and terrorist networks.

Fourth, international development clearly has a role to play in Muslim and African countries. Both are failing to make the pay grade in globalization's spur to faster growth. National governments, including our own, must target development assistance to ensure that the world's poorest countries are incorporated into the development process through investments in education, health, infrastructure development, and other kinds of support mechanisms.

Fifth, we need better mitigation and preventive strategies to deal with new and emerging global security risks. The 2007 World Economic Forum called for the creation of new "coalitions of the willing" involving different groups of countries "in a system of flexible geometry" to manage global risks and to help achieve consensus in those areas where change and mitigation solutions are needed. Canada can help create and lead these new coalitions or global risk managers, especially in areas like nuclear energy and non-proliferation, or global public health, where we have compelling national interests and high levels of knowledge-based capacity.

In sum, there is no shortage of things to do. But we will need political will, leadership, and military, diplomatic, and development capabilities to get there.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENGAGE: CANADA AND THE ONGOING CRISIS IN DARFUR

DAVID BLACK

This article assesses the response of the Canadian government to the ongoing crisis in Darfur against the leadership expectations generated by Canada's role in instigating G8 action on Africa, and in championing the international "Responsibility to Protect." It concludes that, while Canada has met the test of international respectability and burden-sharing among its western peers, it has fallen short of the expectation of a leadership role to which its own previous statements and actions have given rise. Moreover, there are signs of a further retreat from these expectations under the current government. There is a need for continued engagement and leadership in terms of consensus-building, prevention, and practical responses to such 'supreme humanitarian emergencies'.

La présente communication compare l'attitude du gouvernement canadien face à la crise actuelle au Darfour au vu des attentes que le Canada a suscitées en mobilisant le G8 sur l'Afrique et en se faisant le promoteur de la "responsabilité de protéger" de la communauté inter-nationale. Elle conclue que, même si le Canada a passé l'épreuve du respect international et du partage du fardeau avec ses pairs occidentaux, il n'a pas répondu aux attentes de leadership que laissaient présager ses déclarations et gestes antérieurs. Qui plus est, sous le gouvernement actuel, on semble s'éloigner encore de ces attentes. Pourtant, face à ces "urgences humanitaires impératives", l'obtention du consensus, la prévention et l'intervention concrète imposent un engagement et un leadership soutenus.

David Black is Professor of Political Science and International Development Studies, Dalhousie University.

In 2002 the Canadian government used the Kananaskis Summit to set itself up as a leader in G8 efforts to address Africa's extraordinary developmental and security challenges. Similarly, through its support for the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and its subsequent advocacy within and beyond the UN, it established itself as "the world's leading proponent of the responsibility to protect (R2P)."[1] How are we to evaluate its fulfillment of these roles and expectations in the face of the crisis in Darfur, ongoing since early 2003, where Canada's commitments to Africa and to R2P have been simultaneously tested by the Sudanese government's manifest failure to protect its own citizens?[2]

While the Canadian government has met the tests of 'international respectability' and 'burden sharing', at least in relation to its western peers, it has fallen short of the expectations of norm leadership, or leadership by example, to which its own previous statements and actions have given rise. Moreover there are signs that under the current government it is retreating further from these expectations.[3] Of course, the Darfurian crisis is wickedly complex, and there are many reasons why, despite widespread social mobilization and much diplomatic sound and fury, the international response has remained so tragically ineffectual. It is precisely because of this complexity and challenge - typical of crises in which civilians are threatened on a massive scale - that would-be leaders such as Canada should be expected to sustain and deepen their engagement on several levels.

ASSESSING CANADA'S ROLE: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND UNDONE?

How one assesses Canada's role in the Darfur crisis depends on the benchmark one applies. In relation to the first couple of years of the crisis for example, Kim Nossal has highlighted the stark disparity between government leaders' expansive rhetoric on the need to act with the minimal steps taken to argue that both the Canadian government and its public were dangerously addicted to "ear candy," with damaging repercussions for this

country's international credibility.[4] From May 2005 onwards, Canada's tangible engagement with the crisis escalated rapidly, partly stimulated by the Martin government's feverish efforts to win Parliamentary support for its minority budget. Since that time the government's initiatives have fallen squarely within the well-worn parameters of 'helpful fixing' and 'good international citizenship'. Prime Minister Martin signaled the seriousness of his government's intent by appointing a high-level Special Advisory Team composed of Senators Romeo Dallaire and Mobina Jaffer and Ambassador Robert Fowler. The government's humanitarian contributions through CIDA and various NGOs have been substantial though middle-of-the-road - smaller than those of the Dutch and Norwegians for example. In relation to the critical security dimension of the crisis, Canada has been one of the four largest contributors to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) - the African Union's hard-pressed but precedent-setting effort to mobilize an "African (peacekeeping) solution to an African problem". The government's initial contribution of $170 million is now slated to reach $238 million with the latest infusion of support. The forms it has taken have been varied and practical, including the leasing of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and the loan of 105 armoured personnel carriers to give AMIS a measure of much-needed mobility.

Diplomatically, Canadian representatives were active participants, albeit in a supporting role, in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. And, when the Security Council agreed after protracted negotiations to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in March of 2005, the Canadian government was the first contributor to its investigation with a $500,000 contribution. The government's interdepartmental Sudan Task Force (an early experiment in "whole-of-government" policy practice) has been an active and constructive grouping.

This is a respectable contribution if the benchmark is Canada's OECD and G8 peers. However, its critical limitations become apparent when one evaluates the net effect of what has been

done in relation to the situation in Darfur itself, as well as what has been undone.

Canada's support for the 7700-member AMIS, for example, has helped sustain a force that, despite its best efforts, has suffered from critical and predictable shortcomings of troop numbers, command and control, logistics, and sustainability. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated on its watch, as has its standing among Darfuris. This was acknowledged by all concerned when the UN Security Council mandated a new and much larger 'hybrid' UN-AU force in Resolution 1706 of August 2006. Yet the presence of AMIS and the protracted negotiations surrounding its replacement have been manipulated by the Government of Sudan to allow the continued pursuit of its own destructive political and security agenda in the region. Moreover AMIS' extraordinary demands on the nascent peace and security architecture of the African Union have in effect forestalled substantial progress towards the planned African Standby Force and much needed early warning and conflict prevention capacities that would enable the AU to address emergent conflicts, and thus provide urgently needed civilian protection, elsewhere in Africa.

Similarly the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed by the Government of Sudan and one key rebel faction under intense time pressure from Western interlocutors, has in the words of Gareth Evans "comprehensively failed" to advance the peace process. Rather, it "left unresolved critical local grievances… won no effective local support, and has been followed by an intensification… of the fighting."[5] Like AMIS, the DPA has been manipulated by the Sudanese Government to advance its own objectives and delay effective action to end the emergency. And the investigation and now indictments by the ICC, while an important step in the long-term campaign to challenge impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity, have further complicated the process of achieving a political solution to the Darfur crisis in the short to medium term.

What, then, has been undone by the current Canadian government? Two points stand out. First, the Harper government

disbanded Martin's Special Advisory Team shortly after taking office, and has not replaced it with any source of high-level political/diplomatic leadership on this issue. Second, it has resisted calls to pre-commit substantial forces ('boots on the ground') to the enlarged UN-AU force mandated by last August's Resolution 1706. Whether it is *able* to do so in light of its heavy commitment in Afghanistan remains a matter of some dispute; but the juxtaposition of its eager and robust commitment in Afghanistan with its limited and hesitant approach to Darfur speaks volumes about the relative prioritization of these two critical challenges.

Of course, the Canadian government bears only a small share of responsibility for the international community's failures in relation to the crisis in Darfur; in this case the sources of (ir)responsibility are many, as are the challenges of more effective action. Moreover in the face of this critical and prolonged impasse, there are many ways in which true leadership could be exercised -- many if not most of which would enjoy little public visibility. Beyond active and sustained efforts to pressure all parties for the implementation of a more effective hybrid force and readiness to support it, and diplomatic efforts to create the conditions for a sustainable peace process, these would include learning from and looking beyond this crisis. The Darfur imbroglio underscores the work to be done in terms of building a broad coalition of understanding and support for the normative aspirations embedded in *The Responsibility to Protect*; the need in particular to redouble efforts to strengthen international capacities for prevention ("the responsibility to prevent"); and the need, more prosaically, to think in very concrete terms about the capabilities and conditions necessary for effective responses to real-world, real-time "supreme humanitarian emergencies." In fairness, some of this kind of work continues to be done by Canadian officials and organizations. Will it enjoy the sort of firm and sustained political support that the importance of the issues warrants and our previous advocacy on both Africa and R2P would lead Canadians and others to expect?

CONCLUSION

Governments are both entitled and expected to chart their own foreign policy course. But some priorities require a level of sustained engagement that transcends the life of any Parliament or the priorities of any Party. The challenges of advancing African security and development, and of advancing the international community's capacity to forestall and if necessary respond to large-scale atrocity crimes, surely fall within this category. Will the Harper government renew this country's engagement with these challenges, through and beyond the international response to the crisis in Darfur?

ENDNOTES

1. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, "Canada's Human Security Agenda: walking the talk?" *International Journal*, LX (4), 1069.

2. The scale of Darfur's humanitarian emergency, and how precisely it should be defined, are still matters of international controversy. There is a robust consensus, however, that it has cost the lives of more than 200,000 people, has led to the displacement of well over two million, has forced the majority of Darfur's 6 million people to depend on humanitarian relief, and has been marked by widespread rape and other humanitarian atrocities. It is a place of extensive 'atrocity crimes', in which members of the Sudanese government have been directly and indirectly culpable.

3. Signs heightened at the recent G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany by the Prime Minister's assertion that the government could fulfill its 2005 aid commitment to double aid to Africa

between 2003/4 and 2008/9 while spending $700 million less than originally projected, and his public musings regarding a shift in foreign policy emphasis from Africa to Latin America.

4. Nossal, "Ear Candy: Canadian policy toward humanitarian intervention and atrocity crimes in Darfur." *International Journal*, LX (4), 1017-32.

5. Gareth Evans, "Darfur: what next?" Keynote address to International Crisis Group/Save Darfur Coalition/European Policy Centre Conference, *Towards a Comprehensive Settlement for Darfur*, Brussels, 22 January 2007.