

Behind The Headlines

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**Building on the
Past: Future
Directions for
Peacekeeping**

JANE BOULDEN

Building on the Past: Future Directions for Peacekeeping

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Peacekeeping has a new role in th[e] new notion of security. Peacekeeping in the future must anticipate as well as react. It must deal with the causes of conflict and not just their symptoms. It must build peace, and not simply keep it. – Joe Clark, 8 November 1990.

The war in the Persian Gulf, and United Nations actions in response to it, has engendered considerable discussion about the re-appearance of enforcement as a United Nations function. Chapter v of the Charter gives the Security Council the right to use military action to enforce decisions relating to international peace and security. The use of military force in the Gulf under the auspices, although not the flag, of the United Nations has brought to the forefront the enforcement provisions of the Charter. It had been forty years since the United Nations last undertook an enforcement action – in Korea in 1950. In the meantime, it has become commonplace to think of the United Nations as using military might only in the peacekeeping sense, as a way of ending or resolving a conflict rather than participating in it.

The use of force is a dramatic symbol of the shifts in the attitudes of major powers towards conflict resolution and the role of the United Nations in the international arena. One of the most important factors in this shift has been the new working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and a new interest in both countries in using the United Nations process. The willingness of the five permanent members of the Security Council to consider working together marks a turning point for the United Nations. However, the turning point is marked as much by uncertainty as by potential.

As important as the re-appearance of the United Nation's enforcement

Behind The *Headlines*

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function is the revived interest in peacekeeping demonstrated by Security Council members and the changes that have occurred in the nature of peacekeeping operations over the past five years. Prior to 1988 the United Nations had undertaken only fourteen peacekeeping operations. Between 1988 and March 1991 five new operations were begun. As reflected in the statement by Joe Clark, Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, quoted above, there has also been a qualitative shift in peacekeeping. New operations have involved new tasks, such as supervising elections, facilitating a transfer of power, and aiding in the repatriation and resettlement of rebel forces.

These two factors – new tasks and new attitudes – in conjunction with United Nations action in the Gulf crisis, make this an opportune time to examine peacekeeping, as the United Nations and the international community move forward from these changes and events. My assignment is to examine the evolution of peacekeeping and to discuss the implications of the new attitudes and new tasks being undertaken by peacekeeping forces. What new roles might usefully and realistically be assigned to peacekeeping in the future? How far can peacekeeping move inside state boundaries to address potential and real crises? To what extent can peacekeeping lead to peacemaking?

Background

The framers of the United Nations Charter set out to develop an organization which would overcome the problems of the League of Nations by giving the Security Council the right to enforce its decisions, by force if necessary. These provisions are found in Chapter VII of the Charter which, *inter alia*, gives the Security Council the right to 'take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security' (Article 42).

To facilitate such action the Charter requires that member states have forces available on call for use by the Security Council when required (Article 43). The Military Staff Committee (MSC), consisting of military representatives of the five permanent members, was established under Article 47 to assist the Security Council on military questions and to undertake the 'strategic direction' of forces used by the Security Council. The MSC began meeting in 1946, but by 1947 it had reached a deadlock over how the forces referred to in Article 43 would be structured. Although the MSC has continued to meet every two weeks, it has never been used by the Security Council in the way in which it was intended. The question of establishing Article 43 forces died with the end of substantive activity in the MSC in 1947.

Drawing on the experience of World War II, where the co-operation of

the great powers was seen to be key to victory, China, France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were given permanent membership in the Security Council. The voting procedures established effectively gave each permanent member a veto. Thus, Security Council action on matters of international peace and security depended upon the agreement of all five permanent members.

The result was an almost immediate and complete stalemate as the permanent members brought the deepening cold war between East and West to the Security Council. The bipolar nature of the international arena meant that each of the superpowers had a stake in most areas of conflict, and, in consequence, the Chapter VII provisions for enforcement, originally considered the key to success, were virtually shut out of the process of conflict resolution.

Prior to the Persian Gulf crisis, the only enforcement action undertaken by the United Nations was in Korea in 1950 - an action made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union from Security Council proceedings in protest over the continued acceptance of nationalist China as the official representative of China on the Security Council. Because the Soviet Union was not present to exercise its veto, resolutions calling on states to 'furnish such assistance' to the Republic of Korea as was necessary to restore international peace and security and requesting the United States to establish a unified United Nations command were passed. Between July 1950 and July 1953, fifteen states contributed forces to the action in Korea.

Peacekeeping Principles

UNEF

Peacekeeping, as we now know it, evolved to compensate for the failure of the United Nations enforcement function. The first peacekeeping force was established in 1956 to separate the belligerents in the Suez crisis. It is worth briefly discussing the nature of this operation as it established the principles upon which future peacekeeping operations have been based.

In November 1956 Egyptian territory was invaded by France, Britain, and Israel. Because permanent members were involved in the crisis, the Security Council was unable to defuse the extremely dangerous situation. The question was thus passed to the General Assembly,' which spent four days of intense debate on how to respond. Eventually, and with considerable credit to Canada, the General Assembly passed a resolution establishing the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to be deployed as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.

The UNEF mandate required the United Nations troops to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, supervise the withdrawal of forces,

keep peace among the civilian population, and monitor and secure compliance with other United Nations directives. UNEF was not a collective security action as envisaged in the Chapter provisions, and it had no mandate to enforce, rather than supervise, United Nations provisions. Ten countries contributed troops to the operation. Although UNEF was a true military operation made up of national contingents, it was permitted to use force only in self-defence. Thus force could never be initiated by UNEF, and could be used only after all peaceful means had been exhausted.

Observer Missions

Although UNEF marks the beginning of the use of peacekeeping *forces*, the United Nations had previously undertaken four observer missions which are now considered peacekeeping operations. These did not involve the use of a peacekeeping force in the way that UNEF and subsequent missions did.

In 1946 the Security Council struck a committee of investigation to look into allegations that Balkan states on the Greek border were supporting revolutionary forces in Greece and engaging in provocative actions along the borders. This was followed by a General Assembly Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in 1947, which also established observer groups and dealt with associated issues.

After World War II, the declaration of Indonesian independence and the Netherlands' unwillingness to accept that independence resulted in conflict. The Security Council called for a ceasefire on two occasions during 1947 and 1948. In the first instance it asked that diplomatic representatives of Security Council members in Indonesia act as observers of the ceasefire. In the second instance, the consular representatives were once again called upon to act as observers and were supported by military representatives from other states.

In May 1948, a truce commission, previously established by the Security Council, was called upon to observe a Security Council ceasefire in an area between Palestine and Israel where hostilities had broken out. The truce commission was supplied with military observers appointed by the office of the United Nations Mediator (established by the General Assembly). In 1949, the United Nations sent an observer mission to an area of dispute between India and Pakistan to monitor a ceasefire established by a United Nations commission and to observe the withdrawal of troops.

As the above suggests, these missions focussed on observation and on monitoring ceasefires. UNEF departed from this tradition by actively participating in the separation of forces and the implementation of a ceasefire, rather than simply monitoring compliance with such actions.

Based on the UNEF model, a number of peacekeeping missions were established in the ten years that followed. In one way or another they built

on the UNEF experience; some were more along the lines of the earlier observer missions while others, like UNEF, took a more active role in the conflict situations.

Nature of Peacekeeping

As indicated earlier, peacekeeping was not included in the United Nations Charter, and as a result it does not have a specific constitutional grounding or definition. The International Peace Academy defines it as 'the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace.'³

In the years after UNEF, certain general characteristics began to emerge. Broadly, these can be broken down into the following categories: the type of tasks involved; the source and nature of the mandate; the type of situation dealt with; and the governing nature of the operation.

Peacekeeping emphasizes peaceful, non-coercive collective action. Forces are deployed only by invitation and only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Although most operations involve military contingents, the use of force by the military units involved is acceptable only in self-defence.

Peacekeeping seeks to facilitate measures which will contribute to a short-term cessation or prevention of conflict and a longer term restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping operations seek to end or prevent bloodshed and in so doing provide an opportunity for parties to a conflict to work on resolving contentious issues. The operation also isolates the conflict from further external interference and separates it from the larger east-west rivalry.

The Security Council, bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, provides the mandate for a peacekeeping operation. In some cases, the authorization for the operation comes from the General Assembly. The Uniting for Peace resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1950 allowed such action when the Security Council was unable to act on a matter of international peace and security.

The actual administration of the operation is carried out by the secretary-general and his or her office. Personnel are drawn from non-belligerent states and/or states without a stake in the conflict. When involved in a peacekeeping operation, these military personnel are under the field command of the United Nations commander, who is responsible to the secretary-general.

Each peacekeeping operation is different, and as a result the development of mandates and management procedures is ad hoc. While this gives the Security Council substantial flexibility in responding to the specific

needs of each situation, it also creates problems, especially with respect to Financing peacekeeping operations. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations made a considerable effort to develop draft agreements and procedures relating to peacekeeping, but these have never been formally adopted.

Tasks

From an initial emphasis on observer missions, United Nations peacekeeping tasks have expanded to include a variety of missions. The most common is observing or monitoring a truce, armistice, ceasefire, or troop withdrawal and usually includes reporting on the status of the situation and any violations of the agreement or United Nations directives. Peacekeepers are also assigned fact-finding or investigation tasks.

In more militarily related missions, peacekeeping forces are used to provide and maintain a physical separation or buffer zone between adversaries. Again, depending on the situation, the forces may also be responsible for maintaining order among the civilian population.

Recently, peacekeepers were used to facilitate the transition to an independent government in Namibia, a function carried out only once before – in West Irian (West New Guinea) in 1962. And in another new shift, peacekeeping missions now include the supervision of free and fair elections such as has occurred in Central America and in Namibia.

Since the very beginning of the United Nations operations, the bipolar nature of the international arena and the strength of the cold war antagonism between east and west dictated the ability or inability of the Security Council to deal with international peace and security issues. Any issue directly affecting the interests of one or other of the superpowers was unlikely to be dealt with in the Security Council where the veto would be exercised. At the height of the cold war a large number of issues were perceived as directly affecting superpower interests, and superpower willingness to consider action in a large number of areas was minimal. Consequently, the questions dealt with were those in which it was possible to get agreement amongst the permanent members. For the most part, therefore, until the recent shift in superpower attitudes, those conflicts which were considered for United Nations action fell broadly into two categories: conflicts stemming from decolonization problems and conflicts which both superpowers had an interest in seeing resolved.

Table I illustrates the pattern of peacekeeping since the beginning of the United Nations and reflects the characteristics discussed above.

Periods of Activity

There have been three distinct periods of peacekeeping activity. The first

began with the UNEF I operation in 1956 and lasted until 1965. The United Nations was quick to build on the UNEF experience, and seven peacekeeping operations were carried out during this time. In the pause that followed there was considerable debate about the constitutional basis of peacekeeping, its financing, and the problems associated with the operation in the Congo. The next period of activity began with UNEF II in 1973 and ended in 1978 with the operation in Lebanon. The three operations initiated in this period were all in the Middle East, and UNEF II and the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were directly related to the crisis which prompted UNEF I. A ten-year pause followed, and no new operations were launched until 1988. This pause can be attributed in large part to a lack of interest on the part of the superpowers.

Five operations have been initiated since 1988, a spurt of activity surpassing the rate immediately following UNEF I. This activity reflects an increasing demand for peacekeeping, its acceptance as an instrument of international action, and new superpower attitudes towards the United Nations. In a real break with the past both superpowers have accepted peacekeeping operations in areas where they have 'vital' interests: the United States in Central America and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The United States and the Soviet Union no longer view peacekeeping as potential interference in their affairs, but see it rather as a way of facilitating their own foreign policy goals and of working to control-conflict.

The Persian Gulf

This revitalization of interest in the United Nations and its procedures not only holds open the promise of a more frequent and innovative use of peacekeeping, but it made possible the Security Council authorization of the use of force in the Persian Gulf. This action brought the changes of recent years to a head, providing dramatic evidence of their significance and extent, and marked a return, at least in name, to the Chapter VII enforcement functions originally envisaged for the United Nations, the failure of which led to the creation of peacekeeping functions.

The Security Council responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with a series of resolutions: resolution 660 demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; resolution 661 imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and called upon all states to adhere strictly to the resolution; resolution 665 of 25 August 1990 called on states to enforce the sanctions; and resolution 678 of 29 November authorized states 'co-operating with the government of Kuwait' to 'take all necessary means' to achieve an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Although these resolutions invoked the Chapter provisions of the Charter, the mechanisms provided for by Chapter VII, including the Mili-

tary Staff Committee, were not used. In a step back from the action taken in Korea in 1950 where multinational forces worked under the United Nations flag with a unified United Nations command, in the Gulf the Security Council did not authorize the use of the United Nations flag or call for a unified United Nations command.

The unique nature of the situation also restricted the role of the secretary-general. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations have been managed by the secretary-general who seeks contributions, appoints a commander, and establishes a command system. This leaves open the possibility that the secretary-general can continue to use his good offices throughout the process in an effort to work towards a resolution of the crisis. When Chapter VII is used and in the absence of specific command and control by the Security Council, the secretary-general is effectively limited to using his good offices to achieve the goals established in the Security Council resolutions. This limits his ability to mediate and to seek alternative solutions.

The invasion of Kuwait could not be dealt with by traditional peacekeeping measures because the Security Council was essentially faced with a *fait accompli*. This highlights the essential problem of peacekeeping – it can deal only with situations where a conflict has occurred but has not resulted in a clear victory for one side or another and in which it has the consent of the disputants. Short of a voluntary Iraqi withdrawal, which could then be monitored and enforced by a peacekeeping force, there was no apparent role for peacekeeping until the situation had been reversed by other means.

Future Directions

With this background in mind, particularly the experience of the past five years, how might peacekeeping develop in the future? The recent changes at the United Nations suggest that an increasing number of conflicts might be dealt with by the United Nations through an expansion of peacekeeping tasks. Clearly, this requires the harnessing of the current political will relating to the United Nations and entrenching procedures and changes that have until now relied on good will and ad hoc arrangements.

The following discussion of various options for future directions will focus on possible innovative uses of peacekeeping and changes in its nature. Proposals have come from a variety of sources, including the Soviet Union and Canada.

Pre-Conflict Stages

The idea of using peacekeeping prior to a formal breakout of hostilities is innovative both in the nature of the idea and in the ways in which it might

be carried out. Traditionally, peacekeeping has responded to crises after hostilities have occurred. The reason, in part, is that states may see it as in their interests to begin or to continue a conflict but not in their interests to accept peacekeeping.

The United Nations Charter provides for action prior to full-fledged conflict. Article 33 requires parties to a dispute 'which is *likely to endanger* the maintenance of international peace and security' to seek a solution to the dispute through a variety of peaceful means. Article 99 gives the secretary-general the right to bring any matter which he feels *may* threaten international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council (emphasis added).

The time may be ripe for an effort to encourage early United Nations involvement in disputes which threaten to develop into international conflicts. A variety of peacekeeping options could be used to try to ease tensions or defuse the conflict before it develops into a full-fledged military confrontation. The change from past practice needs to be twofold. First, states will need to encourage and accept issues which may not, at that moment, be of crisis proportions. Second, states must be willing to consider implementing United Nations measures at the pre-crisis stage.

One of the new methods which might be used in the pre-conflict stages is confidence-building measures. For example, the United Nations could act as the centre for communication and supervision for such CBMS as exchanges of military officers, inspections of military facilities, and the observation of military exercises between potential disputants. This kind of activity could help diffuse tensions by removing suspicion and perceived threats from both sides. Fact-finding missions carried out by the United Nations could fulfil a similar purpose.

Border security and territorial integrity are key to many interstate conflicts. The United Nations could encourage states that face a real or perceived threat to their territory to request United Nations assistance. A peacekeeping force could be deployed along one side of a border to help maintain border security. This one-sided consent would be of particular benefit to smaller states which may not otherwise be able to muster enough force on their own. The presence of United Nations forces on one side of a border would act as a powerful deterrent against attack. This kind of peacekeeping would require the consent only of the requesting party and would provide time and impetus for discussions between the requesting state and the threatening state in an effort to ease the situation, possibly through measures such as CBMs. If an attack did occur, the presence of United Nations peacekeepers would trigger a further United Nations response. The disadvantage of having the consent of only one state is that the same state could request the withdrawal of United Nations forces, possibly prior to the resolution of the problem. It is interesting to ask how this kind of action might have affected the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Had

Kuwait requested and received such United Nations assistance prior to the invasion, would the attack still have occurred?

A variety of proposals have been made for establishing a war risk reduction centre under the auspices of the United Nations. The secretary-general put forward the idea in 1986, and it has since been supported by the Soviet Union. Such a centre could take a variety of forms and could carry out a 'global watch' function. It would be responsible for gathering information and monitoring situations around the world, perhaps drawing on regionally based centres. Its purpose would be to provide timely information about potential problems to the secretary-general and the Security Council, facilitating the use of mediation and peacekeeping methods to deal with crises before they become full blown conflicts. Depending on the mandate of the organization, it might also be responsible for recommending possible peacekeeping mechanisms to deal with a specific situation and might also act as a multilateral nuclear monitoring centre to deal with nuclear crises or accidents.

To cite again the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, if the secretary-general had had clear unbiased information available to him about the potential invasion of Kuwait he would have been able to bring the issue to the attention of the Security Council before Iraq crossed the border.

The secretary-general's annual report for 1989 outlined the problem:

In order to activate the potential of the Organization for averting wars, the necessity of earlier discussion of situations threatening to explode needs to be clearly recognized. Timely, accurate and unbiased information is a prerequisite for that purpose. At present, the pool of material available to the Secretary-General consists of information provided by government representatives supplemented by the collection and analyses of published reports and comments. This is manifestly insufficient in cases where more than anticipatory diplomacy is required.'

The secretary-general went on to suggest that the Security Council could meet, perhaps at the foreign ministers level and in closed session if necessary, periodically through the year to discuss potential peace and security problems. This would help publicize potential problems and generate support for action and ideas for conflict resolution.

Domestic Sources of Conflict

One of the most contentious areas of potential United Nations involvement is within the boundaries of states. Article 2(7) states: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...' It is, however, increasingly recognized that many interstate conflicts have their roots in domestic problems. Social unrest, economic

decay, food shortages, population migrations, and human rights violations are all domestic problems which may expand across borders prompting disputes and hostilities.

The idea of assisting in 'domestic' areas is not without precedent. For example, peacekeeping operations in Namibia and West Irian have facilitated the transition of governments as part of the decolonization process. The mandate of more than one peacekeeping operation, including UNEF has included the maintenance of law and order among the civilian population. The monitoring of elections is also a function which might, in future, be tied to a 'package' of activities which broadly constitutes peacekeeping, but which includes tasks relating to domestic stability.

Aside from law and order functions and election monitoring, a new and important task that could be given priority is providing security assistance to humanitarian aid. Pre-conflict tensions and full blown conflict often interfere with the delivery and provision of humanitarian aid to needy groups. Such groups may be within, on the edge, or even some distance from the conflict. For example, the actions in the Persian Gulf prevented much needed food aid from reaching Sudan by boat while many people, especially children, are suffering because food and medical aid cannot be taken in to Iraq.

Peacekeeping forces could be used to provide safe passage for food and other types of aid by accompanying the aid and ensuring that it reaches its destination. The secretary-general might also negotiate with the disputants to reach agreement on terms for allowing the peacekeepers to bring in the aid – such as transportation routes and guidelines for avoiding violence. A precedent for this type of activity can be found in humanitarian ceasefires, such as occurred in Central America, where parties to a conflict agreed to a ceasefire for a few days in order to allow children in the area to be immunized.

There is a very fine line between interference in domestic affairs and dealing with potential threats to international peace and security. Even if a revitalized and progressive United Nations could find its way to a greater role in dealing with these sources of conflict, it will succeed only if it continues to work on the principle of consent. For the foreseeable future, state sovereignty must be respected if innovative methods to prevent and deal with conflict are to have any prospect of success.

Naval Peacekeeping

In 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, the threat to international shipping through the Persian Gulf prompted a proposal for 'naval peacekeeping.' The proposal was put forward by the United Nations Association (UNA) in the United States and was also proposed formally by the Soviet Union. The idea was that a Security Council resolution would endorse freedom of

shipping and navigation in the Gulf area and call on member states to protect innocent shipping traffic.

Under the scheme, the United Nations would, on request, flag vessels prior to their passage through the Gulf area. In order to be 'flagged,' United Nations inspectors would ensure that the vessels were not carrying war supplies. If requested, the re-flagged ships would be accompanied by unarmed United Nations patrol vessels on their trip through the Gulf. The proposal was rejected by the United States which, along with other western states, went ahead and provided their own protection to shipping.

There is nothing especially unique about using naval forces to fulfil a peacekeeping mission. Although peacekeeping operations in the past have primarily used ground troops, they have also involved naval forces where they could play a useful role. For example, the United Nations Security Force in West Irian made use of five coastal supply vessels along with a flight of amphibious aircraft provided by the Royal Canadian Air Force. More recently, naval forces were used in the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). Had the United Nations developed an acceptable peacekeeping option for the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, it would have required naval forces on a large scale to monitor a naval ceasefire.

If the UNA/Soviet proposal for naval peacekeeping had been implemented in 1987, it would have been relevant to United Nations efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq war. However, it would have raised questions about the desirability of protecting international rights at sea, such as the right of innocent passage. This raises some important legal and logistical questions which will need to be dealt with by the United Nations if naval peacekeeping in this sense is to be used in the future.

It seems likely that future peacekeeping operations may require or benefit from the use of naval forces, especially as the scope and use of peacekeeping expands. A peacekeeping operation to be carried out in the wake of the Persian Gulf war, for example, will probably involve naval forces in some form. As with the use of other forces, it would be beneficial for the United Nations to have at its disposal information as to bases, facilities, and forces that could be used on short notice. Similarly, a military advisory body, either in the form of the MSC or another grouping, could provide useful advice on requirements and possible uses of such forces.

Peacemaking

An examination of the timeframes in Table 1 reveals that some of the earliest peacekeeping operations remain in place. UNFICYP in Cyprus, for example, has been ongoing since 1964 with relatively little progress towards a solution which would permit the withdrawal of the peacekeeping troops. Some analysts argue that the presence of peacekeeping forces and the

Table I – Overview of Peacekeeping Operations

Operation	Timeframe	Mandating Organization	Tasks	Size
1. Balkans a) Commission	1947-54	Security Council	ascertain facts on border violations	small
b) Special Committee (UNSCOB)	1947-50	General Assembly	monitor compliance with UN directives	
2. Indonesia		Security Council	monitor ceasefire investigate violations supervise withdrawal	63
3. Palestine (UNTSO)	1948-present	Security Council	observe ceasefire	572
4. India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1948-present	Security Council	observe withdrawal observe ceasefire determine violations	40-102
5. UNEF I	1956-67	General Assembly	secure ceasefire supervise armistice lines monitor key areas supervise troop withdrawal keep peace in civilian population	3000-6000
6. Lebanon (UNOGIL)	1958	Security Council and General Assembly	observe no illegal infiltration general observation duties broadened under General Assembly	600
7. Congo (ONUC)	1960-64	Security Council General Assembly	monitor troop withdrawal safeguard territorial integrity, maintain law and order	up to 2000
8. West Irian (UNSF & UNTEA)	1962-3	outside agreement approved by General Assembly	UNTEA : transfer authority observe ceasefire protect rival forces restore situation if ceasefire violated	1629
9. Yemen (UNYOM)	1963-4	outside agreement Security Council approval	UNSF: maintain law and order observe, certify, report on compliance with terms of	189
10. Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964-present	Security Council	disengagement maintain buffer zone	6500-
11. India/Pakistan (UNIPOM)	1965-6	Security Council	maintain law and order observation and monitoring ceasefire and withdrawal	2000 100 of
12. UNEF II	1973-9	Security Council	on western front supervise ceasefire and withdrawal control buffer zone	5000-7500
13. Disengagement Force (UNDOF)	1974-present	Security Council	similar to UNEF II monitor withdrawals & buffer zone between Isreal & Syria	1250

14. Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978- present	Security Council	confirm withdrawal of forces 4000- restore peace and security 6000 assist government in return to effective authority	
15. Afghanistan/ Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988- 1990	Security Council (General Assembly) later Security Council Security Council	oversee implementation of Geneva Accord, including troop withdrawal report on violations	50
16. Iran/Iraq (UNIMOG)	1988- present	Security Council	verify, confirm and supervise ceasefire and withdrawal	350
17. Angola (UNAVEM)	1989-91	Security Council	supervise troop withdrawal	90
18. Namibia (UNTAG)	1989-	Security Council	facilitate transfer of power supervise ceasefire, with- drawal and demobilization supervise elections	4500
19. Central America (ONUCA)	1989-	Security Council	ONUCA: verify no subversive activities report on crossborder movements CIAV (joint OAS-UN): supervise repatriation and resettlement of rebels ONUEN : monitor elections	675

resulting diffusion of a crisis eases the sense of urgency felt by the parties to resolve the dispute, and they may find it in their interests to perpetuate the peacekeeping presence.

Security Council mandates for peacekeeping operations generally include a time limit. However, it is difficult to cut off an operation when it is clear that its presence is crucial to maintaining peace and an atmosphere in which negotiations can be carried out. The initial time limit established for the Cyprus operation, for example, was six months.

Augmenting the connection between peacekeeping and peacemaking has thus become an important issue, especially for countries such as Canada which continue to bear the financial burden for the ongoing operation in Cyprus. As peacekeeping is expanded, perhaps to take on tasks in the pre-conflict stages, the linkage between peacekeeping and peacemaking will become even more important.

There are no clear answers to this problem. In the end, much of the solution depends on an ability to create a situation in which the parties to a dispute have the political will to search actively for an acceptable solution.

A related question that now arises is what should happen in the aftermath of an enforcement action, such as in the Persian Gulf. What kind of mechanisms might or should be used to return stability and peace to the area? To what degree should or can the United Nations and the secretary-general play a role in this process?

A Canadian Role

Although this paper has concentrated on peacekeeping from the United Nations perspective, it is important and useful to end on a Canadian note. Canada, along with the Scandinavian countries, has been one of the strongest contributors and most consistent supporters of peacekeeping. At a time of change in the United Nations, especially in the aftermath of war in the Gulf, Canada could play a critical role in helping to galvanize the current political will into concrete and progressive United Nations action in the future.

In 1965, the United Nations established a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (now the Committee of 34) to discuss and develop ways to strengthen peacekeeping and establish procedures and agreements which could be used for implementing operations. The Committee made considerable progress on some issues but ultimately came to a stalemate on certain key questions.

The current revival of interest in the United Nations presents an opportunity for renewed work in this area. The most obvious step forward is to rejuvenate the work of the Committee. Canada was influential in getting the Committee back to work and could be instrumental in bringing the current political goodwill at the United Nations to bear on the substance of the Committee's deliberations.

A number of specific proposals to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping can be outlined. These might be developed either within or outside of the committee.

In an effort to facilitate the speedy organization of peacekeeping operations, an ongoing proposal has been to earmark forces which member states would be willing to contribute to peacekeeping operations. This information would be used by the secretary-general in organizing any given operation. Along these lines, a proposal that national military training programmes include specific training for peacekeeping forces has also been discussed for a number of years. A 198₉ report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping recommended that the Secretariat establish a registry of military, technical, engineering, and transport equipment that states would be willing to provide if requested. Canada has put forward a more expansive proposal to 'secure a clear indication, from all member countries, of the forces and equipment they could make available in future peacekeeping operations. That effort should include an inventory of civilian resources, including police forces, communications and logistics personnel, and elections experts and observers, which could be used not only to keep the peace but to build for peace.'

As with financing and troop contributions, military planning has always occurred on an ad hoc basis, depending on the operation. The question of adequate military advice in considering and planning peace-

keeping operations is an important one. Various proposals for reviving the Military Staff Committee have been made with this end in view.

The Charter gives the MSC the right to request other states to be present at its deliberations and to establish regional sub-committees. It is conceivable that an agreement to use these provisions to increase the participation and the usefulness of the Committee could result in the MSC being utilized by both the Security Council and the secretary-general. In the end, however, the permanent members will always maintain their right, under the Charter, to hold closed private meetings of the MSC, and this may not be acceptable to non-permanent members.

Given the potential difficulties associated with the MSC, it would be valuable to develop a separate advisory group to the secretary-general in order to strengthen and expand the present office of the military advisor.

As distinct from enforcement operations, peacekeeping troops are authorized to use force only in self-defence, and after all other responses have been exhausted. A clearer enunciation of the non-use of force in terms of specific guidelines for the military would now be useful.

In 1982, United Nations forces in Lebanon were attacked by Israeli forces. The responses of the peacekeeping forces varied, depending on the national units involved. In drawing on the recent use of United Nations enforcement provisions, clearer guidelines for the military on how to respond in such situations might include mechanisms which would draw in an automatic United Nations enforcement response. This would enhance the deterrent function of the peacekeeping presence and ensure support for the peacekeeping troops if attacked.

Conclusion

A variety of new directions in peacekeeping are possible. Of these, peacekeeping assistance for transporting and distributing humanitarian aid certainly deserves support, since this function would be possible even if United Nations agreement cannot be reached on dealing with a conflict in other ways. Some of the most innovative potential changes are those which would seek to deal with crises in the pre-conflict stages. On the other hand, the most difficult future paths are those which seek to deal with post-conflict situations or 'peacemaking.'

The five most recent peacekeeping operations are an important beginning for new United Nations actions, providing a base from which to move forward. However, as much as the United Nations is now presented with an opportunity for new directions, it is also faced with uncertainty. The problems associated with financing peacekeeping operations are substantial and will not be easily overcome, even in this time of high support. More importantly, the coalition of the five permanent members is not an

easy one and cannot be taken for granted for any length of time. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that support for peacekeeping will, as a matter of course, translate into the implementation of more numerous operations with more innovative tasks, unless there are further attempts to stimulate political action.

The creation of UNEF I in 1956 came at a time when it was widely thought that the United Nations was in an irreversible period of stagnation, unable to fulfil its intended functions. UNEF I demonstrated that political will can be translated into concrete action. It may also suggest that Canada has an opportunity to use the respect and influence it has earned at the United Nations since then to help create precedents for the 1990s.

Notes

- 1 J. Clark, 'Peacekeeping and Canadian Foreign Policy,' Department of External Affairs, Statement, 90/65, Toronto, 8 November 1990, 8.
- 2 Under the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, passed during the Korean crisis, any matter which the Security Council is unable to resolve may be placed before the General Assembly.
- 3 As quoted in Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*, London: Hurst, 1984, 2.
- 4 Javier Perez de Cuellar, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1989, New York, United Nations, September 1989, 1.
- 5 Clark, 'Peacekeeping and Canadian Foreign Policy,' 7.

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